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CRIMINAL LA W
CRIMINAL LAW-Constitutional Contract-Courts Can
Vacate Plea Agreements if State Proves Material Breach.
State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 316 N.W.2d 395 (1982).
In State v. Rivest1 the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a
case of first impression, held that a court can vacate a plea
agreement upon motion by the state after the defendant has
begun to serve his sentence. Prior to vacation a full eviden-
tiary hearing must be held, preferably before the judge who
approved the plea agreement, at which the state has the bur-
den of proving that the defendant materially breached the
plea agreement.2 In so holding, the court adopted the consti-
tutional contract theory, a theory the court believes helps to
resolve plea agreement disputes. This theory views plea
agreements, by analogy, as contracts but also recognizes
that, unlike contracts, plea agreements involve important
constitutional rights which courts must safeguard.
This note will analyze the constitutional contract theory
and its application in Rivest. In addition, it will argue that,
while this is a viable theory, the majority applied its princi-
ples incorrectly and thus reached an unjust result, as the dis-
sent concluded.
I. THE FACTS IN RirvEST
After his arrest, Alan Rivest admitted to his participation
in an armed robbery of a gas station with an accomplice,
Edward Rodriguez, but denied any participation in the mur-
der of the gas station owner. Also, Rivest claimed that he
left the scene of the crime prior to his accomplice's flight but
after the stabbing of the victim. The results of a private
polygraph test taken by Rivest indicated that his account
was truthful.
Subsequently, an assistant district attorney entered into a
plea agreement with Rivest in which "Rivest agreed to
(1) plead guilty to a charge of robbery; (2) testify against
Rodriguez whenever requested; and (3) pass a second poly-
1. 106 Wis. 2d 406, 316 N.W.2d 395 (1982).
2. Wisconsin has an established procedure for the withdrawal of a guilty plea
upon a motion by the defendant. See B. BROWN, THE WISCONSIN DISTRICT ATroR-
NEY AND THE CRIMINAL CASE 273-78 (1977).
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graph examination conducted by a party to be chosen by the
district attorney." 3
Following the agreement, Rivest took the second poly-
graph test which was conducted by the police. Rivest pled
guilty and was sentenced to six years in prison. The alleged
breach occurred one week later at Rodriguez's preliminary
hearing when Rivest testified that he had not come into con-
tact with the victim and that "he ran 'straight out across the
street' shortly after Rodriguez stabbed [the victim]." 4
While reviewing the Rodriguez file after his preliminary
hearing, the newly elected district attorney discovered that
evidence existed at the time of the agreement which showed
that Rivest had come into contact with the victim and had
fled the scene with Rodriguez.5 The district attorney con-
cluded that Rivest had breached the plea agreement because
his prior statements and testimony were false. Thereafter,
the district attorney filed first degree murder charges against
Rivest.
Subsequently, Rivest secured a writ of habeas corpus. At
the habeas corpus proceeding the judge held that the state
could not prosecute Rivest for murder unless the state was
able to secure from the judge who approved the plea agree-
ment an order to vacate it. Upon motion of the state, the
original trial judge did set aside the agreement and the guilty
plea to the robbery. The trial judge concluded that "Rivest
had fraudulently induced the state to enter into the plea
agreement through his false and misleading statements and
had materially breached the agreement by giving false testi-
mony at Rodriguez' preliminary hearing."'6
Rivest appealed. Since this was a case of first impression,
the court of appeals petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme
Court for certification. The supreme court upheld the trial
court's decision that Rivest had materially breached the
3. State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 408-09, 316 N.W.2d 395, 397 (1982).
4. Id. at 409, 316 N.W.2d at 397.
5. "All the physical evidence [including the victim's blood on Rivest's clothes
and Rivest's footprint on the victim's head], the names of the eye witnesses and some
statements of the eyewitnesses were in the district attorney's or investigators' files
when the plea agreement was reached." Id. at 425 n.7, 316 N.W.2d at 405 n.7.
6. Id. at 410, 316 N.W.2d at 398.
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agreement 7 and, for the first time, adopted a procedure for
vacating plea agreements based on a "constitutional contract
theory."
II. BACKGROUND: CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTRACT THEORY
In Santobello v. New York 8 the United States Supreme
Court recognized that plea agreements involved constitu-
tional rights of the defendant, that they were legally enforce-
able and that when the state failed to perform as promised
the defendant was entitled to relief.9 Although the
Santobello Court did not explicitly note the similarities be-
tween contracts and plea agreements, later lower court deci-
sions noted those similarities and often applied the
principles of contract law to assist them in settling disputes
which arose over plea agreements. However, the law of con-
tracts would be applied only by analogy because it was rec-
ognized that plea agreements, unlike contracts, involve
important constitutional rights of the defendants. This sec-
tion, therefore, will discuss the two essential elements of the
constitutional contract theory: (1) the application of contract
law to plea agreements; and (2) the constitutional rights of
the defendant which are involved in plea agreements.
By definition a "contract is a promise or set of promises
for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the per-
formance of which the law in some way recognizes a duty."'l0
In Santobello the Supreme Court indicated that a plea agree-
ment also involved promises, for the breach of which the law
gives a remedy or the performance of which the law in some
way recognizes as a duty." I The District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals in United States v. Bridgeman 2 specifically
noted the similarity between contracts and plea agreements:
7. Because a material breach was found which was sufficient to vacate the plea
agreement, the supreme court did not find it necessary to determine whether Rivest
had fraudulently induced the state to enter into the plea agreement. Id. at 420, 316
N.W.2d at 402.
8. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
9. Id. at 261-63.
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
11. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262-63.
12. 523 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976).
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"[T]he decision in Santobello ... involved fundamental
principles of contract law, notably those concerning mutu-
ally binding promises freely given in exchange for valid
consideration."' 13
In addition to the definitional similarities between con-
tracts and plea agreements, the disputes which arise out of
both are similar. The courts have been asked to resolve
whether an agreement was entered into, 14 whether one party
had entered involuntarily or under duress 15 and whether the
nonperformance of one party relieved the other party of its
duty to perform. 16
Thus many courts, noting the similarities between con-
tracts and plea agreements, have found the principles of con-
tract law to be useful in resolving disputes arising out of plea
agreements. For example, in United States v. Calabrese17 the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that, although
not the sole criteria, the "[c]ourts have frequently looked to
contract law analogies in determining rights of the defend-
ants in the plea negotiation process."' 8 Although courts rec-
ognize the existing similarities and the usefulness of
applying contract law to plea agreements, important differ-
ences 19 which exist between the two warrant caution. The
13. Id. at 1109-10.
14. Compare United States v. James, 532 F.2d 1161, 1162-63 (7th Cir. 1976) (evi-
dence did not support defendant's claim that a plea agreement was entered into with
the government) with Ehlers-Mann & Assocs. v. Madison Am. Guar. Ins. Corp., 28
Wis. 2d 12, 15-16, 135 N.W.2d 815, 817 (1965) (evidence supported plaintiff's claim
that it entered into a contract to perform financial services for defendant).
15. Compare United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d at 1109-10 (prosecutor's
promise not to prosecute prisoner in exchange for prisoner's promise to end violence
not enforceable because the prosecutor's promise was secured under duress) with
Stark v. Gigante, 14 Wis. 2d 13, 16-17, 109 N.W.2d 525, 527 (1961) (mortgagor not
able to claim that he was coerced into signing the documents when he was at all times
represented by an attorney who knew the material facts).
16. Compare United States v. Boulier, 359 F. Supp. 165, 169-70 (E.D.N.Y. 1972),
aff'd sub nom. United States v. Nathan, 476 F.2d 456, 459 (2d Cir. 1973) (govern-
ment's promise not to charge the defendant with a second crime not enforceable be-
cause defendant breached agreement providing that he would provide the
government with drug information) with Seidling v. Unichem, Inc., 52 Wis. 2d 552,
557, 191 N.W.2d 205, 208 (1971) (defendant's nonperformance was a substantial
breach of the contract and rescission of the contract was the appropriate remedy).
17. 645 F.2d 1379, 1390, cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981).
18. Id. at 1390.
19. See, e.g., Westen & Westin, A Constitutional Law ofRemediesfor Broken Plea
Bargains, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 471 (1978) ("The subject of [commercial contracts] is
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most significant difference is that constitutional rights are in-
volved in the plea agreement.
Upon entering into a plea agreement, the defendant
waives certain fundamental rights. Justice Douglas, in his
concurring opinion in Santobello, identified those waived
rights: "IA guilty plea] constitutes a waiver of the fAnda-
mental rights to a jury trial, to confront one's accusers, to
present witnesses in one's defense, to remain silent, and to be
convicted by proof beyond all reasonable doubt. 20
Due process rights of defendants are also involved in
plea agreements. The Santobello Court stated that "[t]his
phase [plea bargaining] of the process of criminal justice,
and the adjudicative element inherent in accepting a plea of
guilty, must be attended by safeguards to insure the defend-
ant what is reasonably due in the circumstances.' InAustin
v. State22 the Wisconsin Supreme Court also made it clear
that when a plea agreement is at issue "good public policy
requires the application of the doctrine of due process, which
rests upon 'that whole community sense of "decency and
fairness" that has been woven by common experience into
the fabric of acceptable conduct.' "23
Certain safeguards have been established in an attempt
to protect the defendant's due process rights when he enters
into a plea agreement. The defendant has a right to coun-
sel.24 A plea must be entered into voluntarily and know-
ingly.2- Both the Federal26 and Wisconsin27  Rules of
civil in nature and typically takes the form of an agreement between private parties;
the subject matter of [plea agreements] is criminal in nature and invariably represents
an agreement between a private individual and the state." Id. at 534.) See also
United States ex rel Selikoff v. Commissioner of Corrections, 524 F.2d 650 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976) ("[Contract] principles. . . are inapposite to
the ends of criminal justice. High among those ends are the protection of the public
from criminal behavior and the protection of the defendant from indiscriminate pun-
ishment." Id. at 654.).
20. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 264 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
21. Id. at 262.
22. 49 Wis. 2d 727, 183 N.W.2d 56 (1971).
23. Id. at 736, 183 N.W.2d at 61 (quoting Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436
(1957)).
24. See, e.g., Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 160 (1957).
25. See, e.g., Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261; Cresci v. State, 36 Wis. 2d 287, 296, 152
N.W.2d 893, 897 (1967).
26. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c) provides:
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Criminal Procedure require that before a court accepts a
plea of guilty that court must address the defendant person-
ally to make sure that the defendant enters into the agree-
ment voluntarily and intelligently.
In summary,28 many courts in adopting the theory that a
plea agreement is a constitutional contract have recognized
the usefulness of contract principles in analyzing disputes
arising out of plea agreements but they are willing to apply
those principles by analogy only lest a strict application
(c) Advice to Defendant. Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo con-
tendere, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and
inform him of, and determine that he understands, the following:
(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory
minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty
provided by law; and
(2) if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that he has the right
to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceeding against him
and, if necessary, one will be appointed to represent him; and
(3) that he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it
has already been made, and he has the right to be tried by a jury and at that
trial has the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses against him, and the right not to be compelled to incrimi-
nate himself; and
(4) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere there will not be a further
trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo contendere he waives the
right to a trial; and
(5) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere, the court may ask him
questions about the offense to which he has pleaded, and if he answers these
questions under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel, his an-
swers may later be used against him in a prosecution for perjury or false
statement.
27. Wis. STAT. § 971.08 (1979) provides:
(1) Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or no contest, it shall:
(a) Address the defendant personally and determine that the plea is made
voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the potential
punishment if convicted; and
(b) Make such inquiry as satisfies it that the defendant in fact committed
the crime charged.
(2) The court shall not permit the withdrawal of a plea of guilty or no
contest later than 120 days after conviction.
(3) Any plea of guilty which is not accepted by the court or which is sub-
sequently permitted to be withdrawn shall not be used against the defendant in
a subsequent action.
28. For a more complete discussion on the view that a plea agreement is similar
to a contract, see Jones, Negotiation, Ratification, and Recission of the Guilty Plea
Agreement- -4 Contractual Analysis and Typology, 17 DUQ. L. REv. 591 (1978-79).
For a more complete discussion of the constitutional contract theory, see generally
Westen & Westin, supra note 19.
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should violate the constitutional fights of defendants. It is
this approach that the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted in
State v. Rivest.29
1II. DISCUSSION
A. Application of Contract Law
1. Material Breach
In accepting the view that a plea agreement is a contract,
albeit a constitutional one, the Rivest court recognized that
contract law is useful in resolving disputes arising out of plea
agreements.3 0 In particular, the court indicated that a mate-
rial breach of a plea agreement was similar to a material
breach of a contract.3 1 And the issue which the court ad-
dressed was whether Rivest had materially breached the plea
agreement by giving false testimony. 2
Although the standard of materiality in contract law is
"necessarily imprecise and flexible,"33 both the Wisconsin
Supreme Court34 and the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts35 agree that a material breach is one that goes to the
essence of the contract, that is, one which would deny the
nonbreaching party the benefit of his bargain. Thus, in de-
termining whether a defendant has materially breached a
plea agreement, a court by analogy should ask whether the
29. 106 Wis. 2d 406, 316 N.W.2d 395 (1982).
30. State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 316 N.W.2d 395 (1982).
31. Id. at 411-13, 316 N.W.2d at 398-99.
32. Id. at 417, 316 N.W.2d at 401.
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 comment a (1981), which
states:
[A] standard of materiality ... is necessarily imprecise and flexible .... [be-
cause] [t]he standard of materiality applies to contracts of all types without
regard to whether the whole performance of either party is to be rendered at
one time or part performances are to be rendered at different times. . . . It
also applies to pairs of agreed equivalents under § 240. It is to be applied in
the light of facts of each case in such a way as to further the purpose of secur-
ing for each party his expectation of an exchange of performance.
Id. (citations omitted).
34. See Hoffinann v. Danielson, 251 Wis. 34,38,27 N.W.2d 759, 761 (1947). See
also M & I Marshall & Isley Bank v. Pump, 88 Wis. 2d 323, 333, 276 N.W.2d 295,
299 (1979); Appleton State Bank v. Lee, 33 Wis. 2d 690, 692-93, 148 N.W.2d 1, 2-3
(1967) (citing 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 504 (1964)).
35. RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,§ 241(a) (1981).
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breach goes to the essence of the "contract" or whether the
nonbreaching party was denied the benefit of his bargain.
The majority concluded that the perjured testimony of
Rivest was a material breach because it denied the state the
benefit of its bargain. The state was denied a credible wit-
ness.3 6  However, the majority never considered any evi-
dence which would have indicated whether the state
believed the essence of the agreement was the defendant's
promise to testify truthfully. Rather, the court simply con-
cluded that perjured testimony would always be considered
a material breach.3 7
On the other hand, Justice Abrahamson, in her dissent,
did ask whether the defendant's breach went to the essence
36. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d at 416, 316 N.W.2d at 400.
37. Id. at 416-18, 316 N.W.2d 400-01. In that portion of the opinion the court
supports its conclusion based upon the following: (1) False testimony undermines the
primary goal of our judicial system, justice, and thus giving false testimony of a mate-
rial fact must be a material breach; (2) the Wisconsin Legislature has recognized the
necessity of truthful testimony by making perjury a felony (See Wis. STAT. § 946.31
(1979)); (3) it is unethical and illegal for an attorney to knowingly present false testi-
mony at a trial (See Wis. STAT. § 757.29(l) (1979)); and (4) other jurisdictions have
voided plea agreements under similar circumstances. The court cited United States v.
Eucker, 532 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1976), where the defendant, not the government, moved
to vacate the plea agreement:
The Assistant United States Attorney who represented the Government on
the trial promised [the defendant] that if he pleaded guilty and cooperated in
the preparation and presentation of the case against [another], the Government
would "go to bat" for him. Thereafter, [the defendant] pleaded guilty. How-
ever, his cooperation consisted of presenting the prosecution with a version of
the facts in which he attempted to completely exculpate himself from any
wrong-doing. Under these circumstances the Government was unwilling to
vouch for his credibility and did not call him as a witness. The prosecutor also
did not "go to bat" for him, because he did not consider [the defendant's]
willingness to testify falsely to be cooperation.
The District Court found that this decision was made in good faith and
refused to permit [the defendant] to withdraw his plea. . . . [W]e see no rea-
son to disturb it.
Id. at 256. The Rivest court also cited United States v. Donahey, 529 F.2d 831 (5th
Cir.), cer. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976). In Donahey, the defendant moved for specific
performance of a plea agreement in which the defendant agreed to testify before a
grand jury and to cooperate fully in the prosecution of another accused person. The
court denied the defendant's request for an order of specific performance, finding that
the defendant had not lived up to her part of the plea agreement. The government
produced witnesses at a pretrial hearing whose testimony supported the conclusion
that the defendant was uncooperative and gave evasive, misleading and unverifiable
testimony. Neither the Eucker nor the Donahey court made reference to the constitu-
tional contract theory.
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of the plea agreement. Upon examining the evidence which
indicated the intentions of the "contracting party," the dis-
sent concluded that the breach was not material. 8
It may be argued, as the majority does, that a defendant
should never reap the benefits of a plea agreement if he com-
mits perjury in violation of the terms of the agreement.3 9
However, that rule cannot be supported by analogy to a ma-
terial breach of a contract. Every breach of a contract is not
material. A material breach occurs only if the breaching
party violates the essence of the contract or deprives the non-
breaching party of the benefit of his bargain. In Rivest, by
the state's own admission, Rivest's promise to testify was not
the essence of the plea agreement nor did it deprive the state
of the benefit of its bargain. Therefore, it was not contract
law which the majority was applying, but public policy.
2. Public Policy
The issue the Rivest majority actually addressed was
whether it was against public policy to enforce a plea agree-
ment when the defendant had given perjured testimony,
rather than whether that perjured testimony was a material
breach. Framing the issue in terms of public policy does not
defeat the usefulness of identifying a plea agreement as a
constitutional contract. The Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts recognizes that public policy can limit the freedom to
38. Justice Abrahamson noted:
The assistant district attorney described the defendant's agreement to testify
against Rodriguez as a secondary term of the agreement both at the hearing at
which the guilty plea was accepted and at the habeas corpus proceeding.
When the circuit court explained the terms of the plea agreement to the de-
fendant before the court accepted the defendant's guilty plea, the court did not
refer to the defendant's testimony in the Rodriguez trial at all. The circuit
court referred only to the lie detector test.
Finally, the assistant district attorney, in a letter dated May 30, 1979, in
response to a discovery request by Rodriguez' attorney, set forth the factors
underlying the plea agreement with the defendant and characterized the de-
fendant's agreement to testify against Rodriguez as "not a major factor" in the
plea agreement. The plea agreement hinged on the physical evidence and the
defendant's statement confirmed by the polygraph.
Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d at 431-32, 316 N.W.2d at 407-08 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting)
(footnotes omitted).
39. Id. at 416, 316 N.W.2d at 400.
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contract.40  And the Wisconsin Supreme Court has stated
that it may not enforce a contract when the contract injures
the state or the public, 41 especially when it is an agreement to
commit a crime42 or when it results in the unjust enrichment
of one of the parties. 43 Similarly, the Rivest majority stated
that truthful testimony is necessary "to achieve the primary
goal of our judicial system, justice,"44 that the legislature has
made perjury a crime4 5 and that "[t]o allow a defendant to
claim the benefit of an agreement where he, himself, is in
default, offends fundamental concepts of honesty, fair play
and justice. 46
It is surprising that the Rivest majority did not base its
holding on public policy as opposed to basing it on an anal-
ogy to a material breach of a contract. Perhaps because the
state did not so argue in its brief,47 the court felt it was inap-
propriate to raise the issue sua sponte. Moreover, when a
decision is based on public policy, the court must weigh all
factors, 48 which in this case would be those favoring enforce-
ment as well as those favoring vacation of the plea agree-
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS vol. 2, ch. 8, p. 2 (1981) (Introduc-
tory Note), which states:
In general, parties may contract as they wish, and courts will enforce their
agreements without passing on their substance. Sometimes, however, a court
will decide that the interest in freedom of contract is outweighed by some over-
riding interest of society and will refuse to enforce a promise or other term on
grounds of public policy. Such a decision is based on a reluctance to aid the
promisee rather than on solicitude for the promisor as such. Two reasons lie
behind this reluctance. First, a refusal to enforce the promise may be an ap-
propriate sanction to discourage undesirable conduct, either by the parties
themselves or by others. Second, enforcement of the promise may be an inap-
propriate use of the judicial process in carrying out an unsavory transaction.
The decision in a particular case will often turn on a delicate balancing of
these considerations against those that favor supporting transactions freely en-
tered into by the parties.
41. Hawkins Realty Co. v. Hawkins State Bank, 205 Wis. 406,416,236 N.W. 657,
662 (1931).
42. Kryl v. Frank Holton & Co., 217 Wis. 628, 630, 259 N.W. 828, 829 (1935).
43. Puttkammer v. Minth, 83 Wis. 2d 686, 688-90, 266 N.W.2d 361, 363 (1978).
44. State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 417, 316 N.W.2d 395, 401 (1982).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 414, 316 N.W.2d at 399.
47. See generally Brief for Respondent, State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 316
N.W.2d 395 (1982).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981), states:
(1) A promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of
public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its
[Vol. 66:193
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ment. However, the Rivest decision appears to be outcome-
determinative in that the majority completely ignores the
factors which favored enforcement. The dissent, like the
majority, was concerned about maintaining the integrity of
the judicial system. But it emphasized that the state must be
held to a strict standard of performance to maintain the
credibility of that system:49
In our system of law the state must be held to a high,
strict standard that it fulfill its prosecutorial promises, not
merely to vindicate the expectation of the defendant as to
state behavior but more importantly to vindicate the expec-
tation of the public as to state behavior and to promote the
sound and effective administration of the criminal justice
system. As the United States Court of Appeals said in
United States v. Carter:
"There is more at stake than just the liberty of this de-
fendant. At stake is the honor of the government[,] public
confidence in the fair administration of justice, and the effi-
"150cient administration of justice ....
3. Remedies
In contract law, recission is an equitable remedy5 and a
enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy
against the enforcement of such terms.
(2) In weighing the interest in the enforcement of a term, account is taken of
(a) the parties' justified expectations,
(b) any forfeiture that would result if enforcement were denied, and
(c) any special public interest in the enforcement of the particular term.
(3) In weighing a public policy against enforcement of a term, account is
taken of
(a) the strength of that policy as manifested by legislation or judicial deci-
sions,
(b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further that pol-
icy,
(c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to which it
was deliberate, and
(d) the directness of the connection between that misconduct and the
term.
49. Justice Abrahamson was concerned in the instant case that prior to the time
the state entered into the plea agreement, it did not perform its duties properly; specif-
ically, it did not take the time to evaluate all the information which was available.
Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d at 435-36, 316 N.W.2d at 409-10 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 436-37, 316 N.W.2d at 410 (quoting United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d
426, 428 (4th Cir. 1972), quoted with approval in Cooper v. United Sates, 594 F.2d 12,
20 (4th Cir. 1979)).
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359 comment c (1981). Examples
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remedy in equity is appropriate only when no adequate rem-
edy at law exists. 2 The contract analogy to plea agreements
is strained when it is applied to remedies because the typical
contract remedy at law, money damages, is not appropri-
ate. 3 The Rivest majority, however, never addressed the is-
sues of whether vacation was the only remedy, and, if not,
whether some other remedy may be more appropriate when
a breach of a plea agreement occurs.
Justice Abrahamson, while indicating that under certain
circumstances vacation may be the only appropriate remedy,
warned that the court must "be cognizant of the impulse to
find a remedy for every breach and to vacate the plea agree-
ment in situations where such a drastic remedy is not war-
ranted.' ' 54  An alternative and more appropriate remedy
under the circumstances of this case, which was suggested by
the dissent, would have been to prosecute Rivest for per-
jury,55 a criminal offense56 which carries its own penalties.
Certainly, if a material breach of a plea agreement oc-
curs, vacation may be the appropriate remedy under the cir-
cumstances of the case. However, the Rivest majority did
the law a disservice when, in this case of first impression, it
did not take the opportunity to clarify its position on reme-
dies, especially when its dissenting colleagues brought the is-
sue to the majority's attention.
of other equitable remedies are specific performance, restitution, replevin, reforma-
tion and cancellation.
52. Kramer v. Bohlman, 35 Wis. 2d 58, 65, 150 N.W.2d 357, 360 (1967); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359 comment a (1981).
53. State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 429-30 n.12, 316 N.W.2d 395, 407 n.12
(Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (quoting Petition of Geisser, 554 F.2d 698, 706 (5th Cir.
1977), which states: "When a plea bargain is breached, the courts must fashion a
remedy that insures the petitioner 'what is reasonably due en [sic] the circum-
stanes'. ... Generally, the bargain is 'either specifically enforceable between the
parties to the agreement or the plea is void."' (Citations and emphasis omitted)).
54. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d at 430, 316 N.W.2d at 407.
55. Id.
56. Wis. STAT. § 946.31 (1979).
57. Justice Abrahamson, however, believed that sufficient evidence did not exist
beyond a reasonable doubt to prove that Rivest had committed perjury. Rivest, 106
Wis. 2d at 424-28, 316 N.W.2d at 404-06.
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B. Safeguarding the Defendant's Constitutional Rights
1. The Hearing
The Rivest court recognized that the constitutional con-
tract theory requires that the defendant's constitutional
rights be protected.58 The majority adopted two rules that
have been recognized by other jurisdictions59 as being neces-
sary to safeguard those rights when the government brings a
motion to vacate a plea agreement: (1) a full evidentiary
hearing, preferably before the judge who approved the plea
agreement, is required; and (2) the state has the burden of
proving the material breach.60 Placing the burden of proof
upon the state clearly places the burden where it assures the
defendant the greatest protection. However, the Rivest ma-
jority found that Rivest committed perjury, a violation of a
criminal statute, raising the issue of whether a full eviden-
tiary hearing adequately safeguards the defendant's rights.61
Upon entering into a plea agreement, the state creates
and sanctions a unique relationship with an individual in
which the defendant voluntarily pleads guilty to a crime in
exchange for some benefit to be conferred by the state. The
defendant has the right to expect that the state will perform
as promised. 62 When the state creates an interest or expecta-
tion and then attempts to alter or deny that interest or expec-
tation, due process requires that the individual be afforded
some form of evidentiary hearing.63
58. State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 413-14, 316 N.W.2d 395, 399 (1982).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 537 F.2d 1260, 1261-62 (4th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Donahey, 529 F.2d 831, 832 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828
(1976); Adamson v. Superior Court of Arizona, 125 Ariz. 579, -, 611 P.2d 932, 936-
37 (1980); Gamble v. State, 95 Nev. 904, -, 604 P.2d 335, 336-37 (1979).
60. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d at 414, 316 N.W.2d at 399.
61. Neither the majority nor the dissent addressed this issue.
62. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d at 420,
436, 316 N.W.2d at 402, 410 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
63. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), which states that:
[Tihere exists a variety of interests which are difficult of definition but are nev-
ertheless comprehended within the meaning of either 'liberty' or 'property' as
meant in the Due Process Clause. These interests attain this constitutional
status by virtue of the fact that they have been initially recognized and pro-
tected by state law, and we have repeatedly ruled that the procedural guaran-
tees of the Fourteenth Amendment apply whenever the State seeks to remove
or significantly alter that protected status. ...
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Under certain circumstances, a full evidentiary hearing
may adequately safeguard the defendant's rights. However,
unlike the cases which the Rivest majority cited to support its
holding that a full evidentiary hearing satisfies due process,64
Rivest was a case in which the court found that the defend-
ant had committed "perjury," a term of art which connotes a
violation of a criminal law.65
The sixth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion,66 which has been incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause,67 and the Wisconsin Con-
stitution 68 provide that a person who is accused of commit-
ting a crime is entitled to a full and speedy trial by an
impartial jury. Thus, it can be argued that the Rivest court
erred in requiring only a full evidentiary hearing. A defend-
ant's violation of a criminal statute may be a sufficient rea-
son for vacating a plea agreement. But prior to the court
ordering vacation, the defendant first must be afforded a full
trial to determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether he
committed the crime. Due process requires no less.
In each of these cases, as a result of the state action complained of, a right
or status previously recognized by state law was distinctly altered or
extinguished.
Id. at 710-11 (footnote and citations omitted).
64. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d at 411, 316 N.W.2d at 398. The Rivest court cited United
States v. Donahey, 529 F.2d 831 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976) (state
government alleged that the defendant violated the plea agreement in that she "had
given evasive and misleading answers, had given answers which could not be verified,
and, on numerous occasions, had refused to answer questions at all." Id. at 832);
United States v. Nathan, 476 F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1973) (government claimed that the
defendant had "failed to carry out his bargain by refusing to disclose the promised
information ... ." Id. at 459); and Gamble v. State, 95 Nev. 904, 604 P.2d 335
(1979) (state claimed that because the defendant had refused to stipulate to the revo-
cation of his probation, as agreed, the state was not to be held to its promises. Id. at
-, 604 P.2d at 336).
65. Wis. STAT. § 946.31 (1979).
66. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI, which states that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... "
67. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1, which states "nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.. . ." See Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), as to the right to a trial by jury being incorporated
into the fourteenth amendment.
68. WiS. CONsT. art. I, § 7, states that: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right to... a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or
district wherein the offense shall have been committed .... 't
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2. The Actual Prejudice and Improper Motive Tests
In addition to the full evidentiary hearing and burden of
proof requirements, the Rivest majority held that the "actual
prejudice" and "improper motive" tests were sufficient to
protect the defendant's rights from harm due to
prosecutorial delay when the state brings a motion to vacate
a plea agreement after the defendant has begun to serve his
sentence. 69 The dissent argued that the defendant's rights
are not adequately safeguarded by these tests.70 For the pur-
poses of the following discussion, the right to a speedy trial,
a constitutional right7  which can be affected by
prosecutorial delay, will be used as an example to determine
if the two tests do adequately safeguard a defendant's consti-
tutional rights when the state attempts to vacate a plea
agreement at the post-sentencing stage.
If the state is successful in vacating a plea agreement,
there will most likely be a new trial.72 It is necessary, there-
69. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d at 418, 316 N.W.2d at 401. The court noted that:
Where a defendant seeks to avoid prosecution based upon prosecutorial delay,
it is clear that it must be shown that the defendant has suffered actual
prejudice arising from the delay and that the delay arose from an improper
motive or purpose such as to gain a tactical advantage over the accused.
Id.
70. Id. at 435-37, 316 N.W.2d at 409-10.
71. The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed in the United States and Wisconsin
Constitutions. See supra notes 66 & 68. In addition, the United States Supreme
Court has held that the right to a speedy trial is incorporated into the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S.
213 (1967).
72. Since robbery (the charge in Rivest's first trial) and first degree murder
(Rivest's charge after vacation of his plea agreement) are separate offenses (see Wis.
STAT. § 943.22 (1979) (robbery) and Wis. STAT. § 940.01 (1979) (first degree mur-
der)), the Rivest case presents no double jeopardy problem. See Wis. STAT. § 939.65
(1979) (prosecution under more than one section permitted). See also Harris v. State,
78 Wis. 2d 357, 368, 254 N.W.2d 291 (1977).
In the garden variety criminal case, however, the prosecutor will not usually have
a separate offense available with which to charge the defendant. Moreover, a person
cannot be retried for a lesser included offense which is part of the first charge. See Ex
parte Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889). And some jurisdictions say that a trial for a lesser
offense is a bar to prosecution for the greater charge. See, ag., State v. Labato, 7 N.J.
137, 80 A.2d 617 (1951). But see, e.g., People v. McDaniels, 137 Cal. 192, 69 P. 1006
(1902) (saying that if the first conviction was procured by fraud, connivance or collu-
sion of the defendant, prosecution for the greater offense will not be barred).
In any event, the most recent pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court
on the subject of double jeopardy indicates that that constitutional right will be con-
strued narrowly by the present court. Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2211 (1982) (hold-
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fore, to look at what the right to a speedy trial safeguards in
order to determine if the right has been violated. "This
guarantee [of a speedy trial] is an important safeguard to
prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to
minimize anxiety and coercion accompanying public accusa-
tion and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair
the ability of an accused to defend himself.
73
Upon an initial examination it appears that the Rivest
majority stated the law correctly. The United States
Supreme Court stated in United States v. Lovasco74 that due
process plays a limited role in protecting the defendant from
prosecutorial delay. Only if it is proved that the defendant
suffered actual prejudice and the government had an im-
proper motive is the defendant's right to a speedy trial vio-
lated.75 Prior to Rivest, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, in
State v. Davis,76 adopted the actual prejudice and improper
motive tests. The Rivest court cites both Lovasco and Davis
as its authorities.77
The Lovasco and Davis cases are distinguishable from
the instant case in that they involved an alleged claim of
prosecutorial delay at the preindictment stage.78 By contrast,
the Rivest case involved such a claim at the post-sentencing
stage. As the Supreme Court indicates in Lovasco, there are
legitimate reasons for prosecutorial delay at the preindict-
ment stage. These include: (1) the need to establish prob-
able cause;79 (2) the need to establish a suspect's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt;80 (3) the need to develop the total case if
more than one participant or crime is involved;8 1 (4) the pos-
sibility of hasty or unwarranted prosecutions;8 2 (5) the op-
ing that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment does not bar a retrial after
a defendant's conviction has been reversed because the verdict was against the weight
of the evidence).
73. Williams v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 154, 157, 161 N.W.2d 218, 220 (1968) (quoting
United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966)).
74. 431 U.S. 783 (1977).
75. Id. at 788-97.
76. 95 Wis. 2d 55, 58, 288 N.W.2d 870, 871 (Ct. App. 1980).
77. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d at 419, 316 N.W.2d at 401-02.
78. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 784; Davis, 95 Wis. 2d at 56, 288 N.W.2d at 871.
79. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 791.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 792-93.
82. Id. at 793.
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portunity to give adequate consideration to the desirability
of prosecution;83 (6) the need not to expose undercover in-
formers; 84 (7) the need to determine the degree of punish-
ment that the prosecutor seeks;8 5 (8) the possibility that
offenses may not be immediately reported;86 (9) the possibil-
ity that the investigation may not immediately uncover the
criminal; 87 and (10) the need to assign police resources to
matters of higher priority.88
In addition to these reasons the defendant's right to a
speedy trial is usually not impaired by prosecutorial delay at
the preindictment stage. The defendant is not incarcerated;
the public is unaware of any state accusations against the
defendant; and while there are some risks that the defendant
will suffer anxiety or that a delay will make it less likely that
he will be able to defend himself adequately, these risks are
minimal. Thus, if the defendant at the preindictment stage
claims that prosecutorial delay affected his right to a speedy
trial, the courts have concluded that it is not unreasonable to
require proof of actual prejudice and improper motive.89
At the post-sentencing stage, however, the government's
preindictment reasons for prosecutorial delay are inapplica-
ble and the chances are greater that the defendant's right to a
speedy trial cannot be safeguarded if the plea agreement is
vacated upon motion of the state. Both the Santobello and
Rivest courts recognize this fact as well as the possibility that
other constitutional rights may be jeopardized. 90
The determination of whether a delay in prosecution vio-
lates the defendant's right to a speedy trial depends upon a
review of all the circumstances of the case,9' not solely upon
83. Id. at 794.
84. Id. at 797 n.19 (citing Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial- Rights and Reme-
dies, 27 STAN. L. REV. 525, 527-728 (1975)).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790; Davis, 95 Wis. 2d at 56-58, 288 N.W.2d at 870.
90. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63 (1971); Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d at
413, 316 N.W.2d at 399.
91. Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957); State v. Reynolds, 28 Wis.
2d 350, 352-53, 137 N.W.2d 14, 15 (1965).
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the mere lapse of time.92 As the Rivest majority indicates,
the state and the public interest in preserving the integrity of
the judicial system must be considered.93 However, that and
any other interest must be considered along with factors
which may affect the defendant's right to a speedy trial. In
the Rivest case, there is strong evidence that this right may
have been violated. Almost four years had passed since the
crime. While time itself does not indicate a violation of the
right, Rivest's ability to defend himself may have been
harmed in that witnesses could have become unavailable or
their memories could have faded. Also, the right to a speedy
trial protects the accused from incarceration prior to trial.
Rivest was already serving his sentence based on the plea
agreement. And he was entitled to believe that once he had
entered into the plea agreement, that was the final step, thus
minimizing his anxiety.94
Using the right to a speedy trial as an example demon-
strates how the constitutional rights of the defendant may be
harmed if a court vacates a plea agreement upon motion of
the state after the defendant has begun to serve the sentence.
The "actual prejudice" and "improper motive" tests do not
offer adequate safeguards of the defendant's rights. Those
tests are meant to be applied at the preindictment stage, a
stage where constitutional due process has limited applica-
tion. At the post-sentencing stage, however, constitutional
rights are involved. The Rivest majority recognized this fact
but did not provide adequate safeguards.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States and the Wisconsin Supreme Courts
recognize the constitutional validity of plea agreements.95
And in spite of the controversy which surrounds the propri-
ety of plea agreements, 96 it is probable that they will con-
tinue to be an important tool of the prosecutor in obtaining
92. Commodore v. State, 33 Wis. 2d 373, 377-78, 147 N.W.2d 283, 285 (1967).
93. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d at 416-17, 316 N.W.2d at 400-01.
94. Id. at 435-36, 316 N.W.2d at 409 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
95. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970); State ex rel White v. Gray,
57 Wis. 2d 17, 21-22, 203 N.W.2d 638, 640 (1973).
96. For an extensive discussion on plea agreements, including a discussion on the
propriety of making them, see D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF
[Vol. 66:193
CRIMINAL LAW
guilty pleas, 97 since defendants and the state often find them
advantageous. 98 Courts, therefore, will continue to adjudi-
cate disputes arising out of plea agreements. The constitu-
tional contract theory is one approach which can give the
courts guidance in resolving these disputes while at the same
time protecting the defendant's constitutional rights.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the constitu-
tional contract theory in State v. Rivest, a case of first im-
pression in that the state moved to vacate the plea agreement
after the defendant pled guilty and began to serve his sen-
tence.99 In adopting this theory, however, the court misap-
plied contract law and did not provide adequate protection
for the defendant's constitutional rights. As Justice Abra-
hamson suggests in her strong dissent, the court missed an
opportunity to establish a procedure which safeguards the
rights of the defendant as well as protects the interests of the
public and the state in the integrity of the judicial system.
JOHN F. GALLAGHER
GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966); Special Issue on Plea Bargaining, 13
LAW & Soc'Y RFv. (1978-79).
97. It is estimated that over 90% of all criminal convictions are by pleas of guilty.
D. NEWMAN, supra note 96, at 3.
98. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), which states:
For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of
pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious - his exposure
is reduced, the correctional processes can begin immediately, and the practical
burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the State there are also advantages -
the more promptly imposed punishment after an admission of guilt may more
effectively attain the objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial,
scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in
which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in which there is
substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of proof.
Id. at 752 (footnote omitted).
99. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 316 N.W.2d 395 (1982).
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